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• Limit the number of vessels that can participate
• Set a total allowable catch (TAC) for the fishery
• “Rule of capture” can induce a “race to fish”
Limited Entry Programs
• Common results: 
• Unsafe fishing conditions 
• short seasons 
• risk of over-harvesting
• dissipation of rents 
through “capital stuffing”
• ITQs allocate quotas or shares of 
the TAC to fishery participants
• Shares can be traded between 
participants 
Introducing ITQs
• Predictions about ITQs have been 
borne out in practice:
• Reduction in fleet size
• Increase in the scale of operation 
for remaining vessels
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Increase in the Scale of Operation with ITQs
1) “Consolidation effect”: cost savings from a 
reduction in fleet size and increased scale of 
operation for remaining vessels.
Two simultaneous sources:
2) “Incentive effect”: cost savings from changes in 
fishing practices in response to altered incentives 
provided by the security of harvesting rights.  
Focus of most previous studies.
Relatively neglected.  Requires a deeper 
understanding of how fishermen catch crab.  
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Vessel buyback programs may generate rents 
through consolidation effects.
  
Why do we care?
Question: Can we achieve similar benefits 
as ITQs if we simply reduce the fleet size 
in a limited entry program?
ITQs are not without controversy.  
➔ Sources of rent generation can be captured 
through different policies.
Example 2:
ITQ introduction with a prohibition on quota trading 
(IQs) may generate rents through incentive effects 
without consolidation.
  
Why do we care?
Question: Can ITQs with no quota trading 
achieve similar benefits as ITQs with 
unrestricted trading?
ITQs are not without controversy.  
➔ Sources of rent generation can be captured 
through different policies.
1. How are rents generated under ITQs?
→ What portion of rents can be attributed to:
    a) consolidation effects
    b) incentive effects
Research Questions
2. How do ITQs compare to other forms of fishery 
management (e.g. limited entry, vessel buybacks, 
or IQs)?
1.  Develop a crab harvesting production model
2.  Embed production model in a behavioral model that 
captures the regulatory environment of ITQs and limited 
entry
3.  Solve the model numerically and calibrate it to 2004 
fishery conditions
4.Conduct model simulations to ask “what if” questions:
a.  What if fleet size was simply reduced without ITQs?
b. What if ITQs were introduced but trading was 
prohibited (IQs)?
Methods
Capture the fundamental decisions made by the skipper:
• Soak time
• Number of pots
• Distance between pots
• Velocity of travel
• Pot lifts per day
• Fishing days
• Number of trips
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Timing Handling time / pot:
⌧h = ⌧s + d/v
Soak time / pot:
S = N⌧h
Fishing days / trip:
T f = T/t  T t
Pot sets / season:
PS = T f t/⌧h
⌧h
Pot lifts / season:
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; D = 40, γ = 0.6
competing pot spacing effects that influence catch per pot: a congestion effect and an agglomeration
effect. That is, a high density of pots, and thus bait, will attract more crabs (the agglomeration
effect) but each pot will catch a smaller fraction of the attracted crab population (the congestion
effect). As the area per pot approaches zero (i.e. pots are essentially stacked on top of each other),
each pot will attract only an infinitesimally small fraction of the local crab population so that
the congestion effect dominates the agglomeration effect and catch per pot approaches zero. At
the other end of the spectrum, as the area dedicated to each pot approaches infinity, each pot
catches a larger fraction of the crab population, but less crab are attracted to the pot so that the
agglomeration effect dominates the congestion effect and catch per pot asymptotes to one.
The shape of the N−i congestion index, which can be seen in Figure 7, can be interpreted as
a congestion or stock effect across vessels. With a small number of pots spread across the fishing
grounds, the existence of other pots in the water will have little effect on an individual vessel’s
production from a string of pots and the congestion index approaches one. As the number of pots
in the fishery increases, the likelihood of encroachment on an individual vessel’s string increases,
attracting crabs away from a vessel’s own pots, forcing the congestion index to head to zero as the
number of pots in the water approaches infinity. Thus, the production process of an individual
harvester is intricately linked to the choices and numbers of other vessels in the fishery.
Letting g(d, v,N,N−i) represent the catch per pot relationship described above, we can write
13
PERC Draft





















; D = 40, γ = 0.6
competing pot spacing effects that influence catch per pot: a congestion effect and an agglomeration
effect. That is, a high density of pots, and thus bait, will attract more crabs (the agglomeration
effect) but each pot will catch a smaller fraction of the attracted crab population (the congestion
effect). As the area per pot approaches zero (i.e. pots are essentially stacked on top of each other),
each pot will attract only an infinitesimally small fraction of the local crab population so that
the congestion effect dominates the agglomeration effect and catch per pot approaches zero. At
the other end of the spectrum, as the area dedicated to e h pot approaches infinity, each pot
catches a larger fraction of the crab population, but less crab are attracted to the pot so that the
agglomeration effect dominates the congestion effect and catch per pot asymptotes to one.
The shape of the N−i congestion index, which can be seen in Figure 7, can be interpreted as
a congestion or stock effect across vessels. With a small number of pots spread across the fishing
grounds, the existence of other pots in the water will have little effect on an individual vessel’s
production from a string of pots and the congestion index approaches one. As the number of pots
in the fishery increases, the likelihood of encroachment on an individual vessel’s string increases,
attracting crabs away from a vessel’s wn pots, forcing the congestion index to head to zero as the
number of pots in the water approaches infinity. Thus, the production process of an individual
harvester is intricately linked to the choices and numbers of other vessels in the fishery.




= PL ⇥ catch
pot
PERC Draft
the distance between pots d, the speed at which the vessels travels v, and the number of trips t
taken during the season. Thus, we have the following relationships for soak time per pot S, handling
time per pot τh, pots lifted per season PL, pots set per season PS , and time spent fishing during a
trip T f :






Sd > 0 Sv < 0 SN > 0
τh = τh(d, v) = τs +
d
v τhd > 0 τhv < 0
T f = T f(t, T ) = T/t− T t T ft < 0 T
f
T > 0
PS = PS(d, v, t, T ) = T
f (t,T )
τh(d,v)
t PSd < 0 P
S
v > 0 P
S
t < 0 P
S
T > 0
PL = PL(d, v,N, t, T ) = PS(d, v, t, T )−N PLd < 0 P
L
v > 0 P
L
N < 0 P
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3.1 Seasonal Production Function
The amount of crab caught throughout a season revolves around the productivity of each pot
used by a vessel. We model a vessel’s catch per pot as a saturating function of soak time that is
sensitive to the density of pots surrounding it. In particular, we assume that catch per pot follows








= δf(S) f ′ > 0, f ′′ < 0
where δ represents a “congestion” index which lies between 0 and 1, D represents a “congestion-
free” asymptotic catch per pot, and γ represents the rate at which the asymptotic catch is reached.
The shape of this saturating function can be seen in Figure 6. The congestion index is modeled to
be a function of the density of its own pots within a working circle and the total number of pots
used in the fishery so that there is a production/congestion externality across vessels. Specifically,




(1 + exp{λd(density −md)})
$ #
1
(1 + exp{λN (N−i −mN )})
$
(8)
where density = 4π/Nd2 is the number of own pots per unit area of the working circle and N−i is
the number of pots supplied by all other vessels in the fishery. The parameters λd and λp jointly
determine the rate at which the congestion index approaches 0, while the parameters md and mp
are the levels of own pot density and pots in the fishery, respectively, at which the decline in the
congestion index is at its greatest.
The shape of the density congestion index, which can be seen in Figure 7, is consistent with two
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of pots, and thus bait, will attract more crabs (the agglomeration e↵ect) but each pot will catch a smaller
fraction of the attracted crab population (the congestion e↵ect). As the area per pot approaches zero (i.e.
pots are essentially stacked on top of each other), each pot will attract only an infinitesimally small fraction
of the local crab population so that the congestion e↵ect dominates the agglomeration e↵ect and catch per
pot approaches zero. At the other end of the spectrum, as the area dedicated to each pot approaches infinity,
each pot catches a larger fraction of the crab population, but less crab are attracted to the pot so that the
agglomeration e↵ect dominates the congestion e↵ect and catch per pot asymptotes to one.


































Figure 7(b): Others Pot Congestion Index








Figure 7: Congestion Index: (a) Own pot congestion and (b) others’ pot congestion.
The shape of the others pot congestion index (Figure 7(b)) can be interpreted as a congestion or stock
externality across vessels. With a small number of pots spread across the fishing grounds, the existence
of other pots in the water will have little e↵ect on an individual vessel’s production from a string of pots
and the congestion index approaches one. As the number of pots in the fishery increases, the likelihood
of encroachment on an individual vessel’s string increases, attracting crabs away from a vessel’s own pots,
forcing the congestion index to head to zero as the number of pots in the water approaches infinity. Thus,
the production process of an individual harvester is intricately linked to the choices and number of other
vessels in the fishery.
Letting g(d, v,N,N i) represent the catch per pot relationship described above, we can write catch per
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of pots, and thus bait, will attract more crabs (the agglomeration e↵ect) but each pot will catch a smaller
fraction of the attracted crab po ulation (the congestion e↵ ct). As the area per pot approaches zero (i.e
pots are ess ntially stacked on top of each other), each pot will attract only an infinitesimally small fraction
of the local crab po ulation so that the congestion e↵ ct dominates the agglomeration e↵ect and catch per
pot approaches zero. At the other nd of the spectrum, as the area de icated to each pot approaches infinity,
each pot catches a l rger f action of the crab po ulation, but less crab are attracted to the pot so that he
agglomeration e↵ ct dominates the congestion e↵ ct and catch per pot asympto es to ne.
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of pots, and thus bait, will attract more crabs (the agglomeration e↵ect) but each pot will catch a smaller
fraction of the attracted crab population (the congestion e↵ect). As the area per pot approaches zero (i.e.
pots are essentially stacked on top of each other), each pot will attract only an infinitesimally small fraction
of the local crab population so that the congestion e↵ect dominates the agglomeration e↵ect and catch per
pot approaches zero. At the other end of the spectrum, as the area dedicated to each pot approaches infinity,
each pot catches a larger fraction of the crab population, but less crab are attracted to the pot so that the
agglomeration e↵ect dominates the congestion e↵ect and catch per pot asymptotes to one.
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throughout the season. In particular, let usage costs per season be the sum of a seasonal opportunity
cost of using a vessel r and seasonal opportunity costs cN for all pots so that usage costs per season
are
cu = r + cNN. (11)
In addition, we assume that operating costs during the season consist of the direct costs of set-
ting/lifting pots cp, the steaming cost per pot multiplied by the number of pots pulled throughout















= PS(d, v, t, T ) (cp + φ(d, v)) + clT, (12)
where we assume that steam cost per pot has the form φ(d, v) = αvβd, so that steam cost per pot
is linear in the distance traveled between pots and convex in velocity (i.e. β > 1).
Putting all costs together and assuming that travel costs per trip ct are exogenously determined,
we have the following expression for costs per trip as a function of d, N , v, and t:
cost
season
= cu + co + ctt (13)
= r + cNN + P





+ clT + ctt
= C(d, v,N, t, T )
Thus, seasonal costs are linear in the number of pots used in a string and depend on a complex
relationship between the distance traveled around a string, travel velocity, and the number of trips
per season.
3.3 Season Length and Regulatory Behavior
The length of season faced by all vessels in the fishery depends on the existing regulatory environ-
ment of the fishery. For instance, if the fishery is characterized by catch shares, then season length
is simply modeled as the length of time it takes for a vessel to reach its individual quota Q. Thus,
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Figure 7: Congestion Index: md = 0.05, λd = 80, mN = 44, 146.5, λN = 10−4











= PL(d, v,N, t, T ) × δf(S(d, v,N))
= PL(d, v,N, t, T ) × g(d, v,N,N−i) (9)
Thus, the amount of crab caught in a season depends on a complex relationship between the distance
traveled around a string, travel velocity, the number of pots in a string, the number of trips in a
season, and the production decisions of all other vessels in the fishery.
3.2 Seasonal Costs




= cu + co + ctt, (10)
where cost per season is divided in o three components, usage costs cu, which consist of a fixed
opportunity cost of committing a vessel and N pots to the fishery, operating costs co, which consist
of everyday fishing operations, su h as baiting pots, traveling between pots, and the cost of labor,
and travel costs ctt which are the costs incurred from traveling to and from the fishing grounds
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Figure 7: Congestion Index: md = 0.05, λd = 80, mN = 44, 146.5, λN = 10−4
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of everyday fishing operations, such as baiting pots, trav ling between po s, and the cost of labor,
and travel costs ctt which ar the costs incurred from traveli g o and from the fishi g grounds
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C( , v,N, t, T ) =
Behavioral Model
Behavioral Model
• Each vessel chooses an action and commits to this action for the 
entire season
where d > 0 v̄ > v > 0 N > 0 t 2 {1, 2, 3, . . . }
• Actions chosen to maximize seasonal profits given the actions of all 
other vessels:
PERC Draft
If instead, the fishery is managed by a limited entry program, we assume that a regulator
chooses a season length based on a biologically determined TAC (Q̄) to ensure that the TAC is not
exceeded. That is, to prevent overexploitation of the crab stock, the regulator chooses a season
length based on the anticipated number of vessels in the fishery and the intensity in which they
fish. If we assume that there are η homogeneous vessels, then the regulator’s decision rule is simply






τh(d, v) + T
tt. (15)
3.4 Characterizing Fishermen Behavior
Using the previously described crab harvesting production process and regulatory behavior, we
are now able to characterize fishermen behavior under two different regulatory structures for the
fishery. We assume that fishermen act to maximize seasonal profits by committing to a number
of pots N , a travel velocity v, and a distance d between pots that are all constant over the entire
season and by choosing the number of trips t they will make during the season, keeping in mind
that the amount of crab caught during a trip cannot be greater than the vessel’s hold capacity
H and that catch will deteriorate over the course of a trip. To model catch deterioration, we let
the ex-vessel price of crab ρ be a decreasing function of time spent fishing and traveling to shore
during a trip (Figure 8): ρ(t, T ) = ρ̄−θ
#
T f (t, T ) + 12T
t
$σ
. We can therefore characterize fishermen
behavior by the following maximization problem:
max
d,v,N,t
Π = ρ(t, T )PL(d, v,N, t, T )g(d, v,N,N−i)− C(d, v,N, t, T )
= ρ(t, T )PL(d, v,N, t, T )δ(d,N,N−i)f(d, v,N) (16)
−
#
r + cNN + P
S(d, v, t, T ) (cp + φ(d, v)) + clT + ctt
$
subject to PL(d, v,N, t, T )g(d, v,N,N−i) ≤ H
Consider a limited entry fishery consisting of η atomistic homogeneous vessels with a TAC of
Q̄. Fishermen do not consider their own effect on the length of the season, but realize that season
length is determined by the actions of all other vessels in the fishery and the regulator. Thus, the
regulated restricted access fishery is a game between all fishermen and the regulator. Then for any
















• Each fishery is static game of complete information between    




fisheries. That is, all players are assumed to move only once, simultaneously, without knowing the actions of
their rivals but knowing the potential payo↵s for each player. In each game, harvesters choose an action at
the beginning of the season from the feasible strategy set, which consists of a number of pots 0 < N , a travel
velocity 0 < v < v̄, and a distance between pots 0 < d, that are all constant over the entire season, and
the number of trips t 2 {1, 2, 3, ...} they will make during the season. Players are assumed to choose actions
to maximize a payo↵ function ⇧ – their seasonal quasi-rents (revenue minus variable costs) – for any given
strategy of their rivals, keeping in mind that the amount of crab caught during a trip cannot be greater than
the vessel’s hold capacity H:
max
d,v,N,t







The two games di↵er only by their respective definitions of season length, which are determined by the
regulatory rule that ensures that a biologically determined TAC is not exceeded. If the fishery is characterized
by catch shares, then season length is simply modeled as the length of time it takes for a vessel to reach













(d, v) + T tt. (15)
Each identical harvester is assumed to be allocated the same portion of the TAC so that there are no gains
to trade remaining in the quota market, resulting in Q = TAC/⌘.8 Note that in this case, the actions of
other harvesters a↵ect an individual’s season length only through a congestion e↵ect on catch per pot.
If the fishery is managed by a limited entry program, then season length is modeled as the length of time
it takes for the entire fleet to reach the TAC. Assuming that all other players choose the same actions and
letting the subscript  i represent the common actions of other players, then an individual harvester’s season











⌧h(·) t + N
⌘













The season length for the limited entry fishery di↵ers from that of the catch share fishery due to the fact that
the limited entry harvestable stock is a common property resource. That is, unlike the catch share fishery,
8This assumption follows other intraseasonal models of harvester behavior under rights-based management, such as Costello
and Deacon (2007) and Fell (2009).
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ITQ Season Length          :T ITQ
Limited Entry Season Length        :TLE
Working Paper
Actual Median Model Prediction
Calibration (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Point 2004 2006 Di↵erence (%) 2004 2006 Di↵erence (%)
Soak time (days) 1.02 1.54 +50.94 1.24 1.59 +28.23
Pot lifts/day 111.67 83.17 -25.52 143.58 80.03 -44.26
Fishing days 3.00 9.00 +200.00 3.71 10.92 +194.34
Registered pots 200.00 150.00 -25.00 178.62 127.38 -28.69
Crabs/pot 21.00 30.00 +42.86 27.06 38.14 +40.95
Fuel/crab (gal) 0.842 0.413 -50.95 0.556 0.148 -73.38
Table 1: Calibration and model validation – actual medians and model predictions for 2004 and 2006.
The actual medians for 2004 were used as calibration points.
42







































































Policy Implications:  Variable Costs
ITQs, IQs, and vessel buybacks have the potential for 
tremendous cost savings in the RKC fishery
1. Incentive effect induces 
harvesters to “slow down”
2. Consolidation allows 
harvesters to spread 

























Variable Cost per Crab
⇒ ITQs capture cost savings from both incentives and 
consolidation.
Policy Implications:  Fishery Rents
1. Majority of rent generation 
comes from elimination of 
redundant capital 
2. IQs generate only marginal 





















ITQs, IQs, and vessel buybacks have the potential to 
generate moderate rents in the RKC fishery.
Limited entry RKC fishery was already generating rents! 
How?
1. Maximum velocity is 
binding, preventing 
vessels from competing 
away rents. 
2. Cost of fuel low relative to 
the price of crab.
Working Paper
Use of Time
Velocity Pot Lifts per Soak Time Fishing
Institution (knots) Fishing Day (days) Days Trips
(a) LE
232
12.5 143.6 1.24 3.71 1
(b) LE
78
12.5 160.1 1.74 6.45 1
(c) ITQ
232
5.94 61.4 1.05 5.43 1
(d) ITQ
78
6.55 85.2 1.49 10.29 2
Use of Space
Distance Inverse Own Inverse
Institution Pots (nm) Congestion Index Congestion Index
(a) LE
232
178.61 1.10 0.716 0.974
(b) LE
78
278.88 0.89 0.961 0.977
(c) ITQ
232
64.67 1.85 0.975 0.981
(d) ITQ
78
126.65 1.33 0.979 0.982
Production/Rents
Catch per Ave. Var able Rents per Total
Institution Day (crabs) Cost ($/crab) Vessel ($)a Rents ($)a
(a) LE
232
2581 2.24 234,370 54,373,840
(b) LE
78
4412 1.18 795,850 62,076,300
(c) ITQ
232
1762 1.10 244,590 56,744,880
(d) ITQ
78
2765 0.81 810,220 63,197,160
aThe rents reported in this table are measured before payments to labor, reflecting the nature of
the share system in the RKC fishery.
Table 2: Simulation results for di↵erent institution types and number of vessels. The total e↵ect of ITQ
introduction is row (a) vs. row (d) (movement A). The incentive e↵ect is row (a) vs. row (c) (movement
B) or row (b) vs. row (d) (movement C). The consolidation e↵ect is row (a) vs. row (b) (movement D)




Velocity Pot Lifts per Soak Time Fishing
Institution (knots) Fishing Day (days) Days Trips
(a) LE
232
12.5 143.6 1.24 3.71 1
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278.88 0.89 0.961 0.977
(c) ITQ
232
64.67 1.85 0.975 0.981
(d) ITQ
78
126.65 1.33 0.979 0.982
Production/Rents
Catch per Ave. Variable Rents per Total
Institution Day (crabs) Cost ($/crab) Vessel ($)a Rents ($)a
(a) LE
232
2581 2.24 234,370 54,373,840
(b) LE
78
4412 1.18 795,850 62,076,300
(c) ITQ
232
1762 1.10 244,590 56,744,880
(d) ITQ
78
2 65 0.81 810,220 63,197,160
aThe rents reported in this table are measured before payments to labor, reflecting the nature of
the share system in the RKC fishery.
Table 2: Simulation results for di↵erent institution types and number of vessels. The total e↵ect of ITQ
introduction is row (a) vs. row (d) ( ovement A). The incentive e↵ect is row (a) vs. row (c) (movement
B) or row (b) vs. row (d) ( ove ent C). The consolidation e↵ect is row (a) vs. row (b) (movement D)
or row (c) vs. row (d) (movement E).
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Policy Implications:  Fishery Rents















Pot Lifts per Day






















































Fuel price = p2004












Total Effect (ITQs) Incentive Effect (IQs) Consolidation Effect (Vessel Buybacks)
⇒ Rent generation from ITQ incentives has the potential to be large 
if fuel prices continue to rise relative to crab prices.
Conclusion
1. Consolidation: 
a. eliminates redundant capital
b. vessels can take advantage of scale economies
c. “intensifies” harvesting behavior
Rent generation from ITQs arises from two sources:
2. Incentives: 
a. “slows down” harvesting behavior
b. reduces variable costs per crab
Conclusion
1. Vessel buybacks under limited entry: 
a. rent generation from consolidation effects
b. particularly beneficial if lots of excess capital
c. relies on a technological constraint 
d. may not be sustainable in the long run
e. must consider the cost of buying back vessels
Each source can be captured by alternative policies:
Conclusion
Each source can be captured by alternative policies:
2. ITQs with prohibition on quota trading (IQs): 
a. rent generation from incentive effects
b. particularly beneficial if rents are dissipated under 
limited entry
c. does not take advantage of cost savings from 
redundant capital elimination and scale 
economies
ITQs take advantage of both sources of rent generation and thus 
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Season
Change in Median Pot Lifts per Fishing Day
trap limits 
removed
ITQs 
introduced
trap limits 
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